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Abstract  
 
Over the last two decades, municipal human rights institutions have proliferated around the 
world. One of the newest examples of such initiatives is the Seoul Human Rights 
Ombudsperson Office, which was established in January 2013 as one of the core institutions 
of human rights protection in Seoul, Korea. This article will present a case study of the 
operations of the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson Office based on interviews and 
documentary research. It will focus on the question of how this newly established institution 
fits into the existing human rights regime, and in particular address three distinct issues, 
namely the degree to which the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson Office reflects local 
versus national or international influences, the types of institutional relationships it has with 
other human rights actors, and the degree to which it implements local versus national or 
international human rights norms.   
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I. Introduction 
 
For much of the history of the human rights movement, norm-development and institution-
building have taken place almost exclusively at the national and international levels.
1
 Over 
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 The most significant historical exception to this statement is the human rights commissions established in 
many US cities at an early date. However, even these human rights commissions were until recently far more 
engaged with domestic ‘civil rights’ norms than international ‘human rights’ law: Kenneth L Saunders and Hyo 
 
 
the last two decades, however, municipalities around the world have become increasingly 
engaged with human rights, and one manifestation of this has been the establishment of 
independent municipal bodies to promote and protect human rights. These have included 
committees, ombudsperson institutions, monitoring centres, and a range of locally developed 
institutions, sometimes focusing on a particular sub-category of rights, and sometimes 
tackling the full range of human rights issues. In many cities, especially in the civil law world, 
human rights ombudspersons – generally defined as ombudsperson institutions that have an 
explicit mandate to protect human rights – have been the preferred institutional form. 2 
Prominent examples include the Ombudsman de Montreal, Defensor del Pueblo de la Ciudad 
de Buenos Aires, and the Johannesburg Office of the Ombudsman. 
 Despite their increasing importance, municipal human rights institutions have 
received relatively little attention from academics.
3
 With the exception of a few country or 
region-specific studies,
4
 the English-language literature has mostly dealt with municipal 
human rights ombudspersons somewhat tangentially, in articles that either focus more 
broadly on local human rights implementation or on the development of the national 
ombudsperson institution in a particular country or region.
5
 To a certain extent, major human 
rights advocacy organisations have likewise ignored local human rights institutions, 
preferring to lobby for change in national capitals or international centres.
6
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This article will attempt to take a step towards filling this gap in the literature through 
a case study of the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson.
 7
 It will focus in particular on how 
the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson Office relates to and fits in with the existing human 
rights apparatus and norms, an issue that is important for newly established sub-national 
human rights institutions all around the world, given that they are generally superimposed 
upon an already existing fabric of domestic, regional and global human rights institutions and 
norms.
8
 If new sub-national institutions duplicate the functions of existing mechanisms, lead 
to divergent jurisprudential interpretations, or draw resources away from more effective 
human rights institutions, then they arguably serve little purpose. On the other hand, if they 
fill an unmet need, build upon existing institutional strengths, and promote the development 
of a coherent normative framework, then such institutions can provide a valuable addition to 
the human rights regime.  
Thus, the study will address three particular questions. First, to what extent is the 
Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson a product of global or national influences, and to what 
extent is it the result of local initiatives? Second, what are the institutional relationships that 
have been forged between the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson and the many other 
existing human rights institutions at the sub-national, national and global human rights bodies? 
And third, to what extent does the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson use existing human 
rights norms from international or national law, and to what extent does the Ombudsperson 
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Office serve as a vehicle for developing and elaborating new human rights norms? These 
questions will be answered largely through a review of materials published by the bodies and 
commentary on their operations gleaned from conference presentations and local journals, as 
supplemented by e-mail and in-person interviews with actors directly involved in the 
operations of the office. 
There are a number of reasons why the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson Office 
can be a particularly interesting and important subject for a case study. For one thing, its 
sheer size makes the city of Seoul an important subject of research. With a population of 
slightly over 10 million, its human rights policies can affect the well-being of more people 
than, for example, the total population of Sweden. Second, Seoul is a particularly high-profile 
municipality in East Asia, and its human rights policies are likely to have an impact on other 
cities in the region (and indeed, arguably already are, as described below). This impact is 
likely to be particularly marked because municipal human rights institutions are still 
relatively rare in Asia, when compared to Europe or the Americas.
9
 Finally, Seoul’s 
establishment of a human rights ombudsperson office (and other human rights institutions) is 
particularly interesting from a human rights governance perspective because it has emerged 
on largely virgin ground: unlike many western countries, there was no pre-existing municipal 
ombudsperson or civil rights commission that over time assumed a human rights competency. 
Rather, new bodies were designed from scratch, in ways that could potentially allow for the 
integration of norms and concepts from both local and international sources. 
 
 
II. Background to Human Rights in Korea 
 
In order to better understand the development of the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson 
Office, this section will first provide contextual background on Korea’s engagement with 
human rights policies and institutions. For much of Korea’s modern history, human rights 
were not well protected by government at any level.
10
 From Korea’s independence in 1948 
                                                          
9
 Seoul is one of the first major cities in Asia to establish a human rights ombudsperson office. The only 
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877, 880. 
 
 
until its democratisation in 1987, the country was ruled by a series of military and dictatorial 
leaders who routinely engaged in arbitrary detention, torture, censorship, restrictions on 
freedom of association and other violations of basic civil and political rights. During this 
period, and especially after the passage of the authoritarian Yushin constitution in 1972, 
democratisation protesters nevertheless fought courageously against the regime, often at 
significant personal cost. Many of these protestors strongly identified with the human rights 
movement, including most prominently the future president and Nobel Prize winner Kim Dae 
Jung, who championed ‘human rights’ in speeches as early as 1983, and later publicly 
defended the human rights movement against the so-called Asian Values challenge that 
emanated from Singaporean and Malaysian politicians in the early 1990s. Several other 
democratisation activists were in fact human rights lawyers, including Roh Moo Hyun (who 
became president from 2003-2008), Park Won-soon (mayor of Seoul as of 2016), and Moon 
Jae-In (leader of Korea’s main progressive party, the Minjoo Party of Korea, from 2015-
2016).  
 After Korea’s post-1987 democratisation, the country gradually integrated itself into 
the global human rights system. Korea acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1990, 
the UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees in 1992, and the Convention against 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 1995.
11
 In 1994, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a Human Rights and Social Policy division, and 
Korea was a member of the UN Commission on Human Rights from 1993 to 1998.
12
 It took 
somewhat longer for Korea to develop strong human rights institutions at the domestic level. 
While the Ministry of Justice had established a Human Rights Division in 1962, it was 
viewed as window dressing until the 1990s.
13
 After years of debate, the National Human 
Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK) was established in 2001 to promote and protect 
human rights within the country. Meanwhile, starting in 1996, a series of issue-specific truth 
commissions were set up to address past human rights abuses, culminating in the 
establishment of the more broadly mandated Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which 
operated from 2005 to 2010.
14
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 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Status of Ratifications’ 
<http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=141&Lang=EN> accessed 6 
January 2016. 
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 Baik (n 10) 894. 
 
 
 While human rights norms are now firmly entrenched in Korea’s domestic and 
international policies, human rights issues remain politically contentious in contemporary 
Korea. Since 1987, many of the leaders of Korea’s main progressive parties have been former 
democratisation activists who are quite comfortable with the language and politics of human 
rights (and, in several cases, self-identify as human rights activists). Conservative leaders, on 
the other hand, often are identified with the pre-1987 authoritarian leadership, and no one 
more so than President Park Geun Hye, whose father ruled Korea autocratically from 1961 to 
1979. Conservative politicians and their supporters have tended to view the human rights 
movement with suspicion, at least as applied domestically.
15
 According to one commentator, 
‘The struggle between the conservatives who support authoritarian regimes and the liberals or 
progressives who want to move ahead to achieve the consolidation of democracy and sound 
human rights systems is not over yet.’16 
Despite the salience of human rights in Korean political discourse and its increasing 
institutionalisation at the national level, there was until recently little attention paid to human 
rights at the local governmental level. In part, this was unsurprising:  there is no tradition of 
local government involvement in human rights institutionalisation in East Asia, and local 
governments in Korea (whether at the upper or lower level) possess relatively little autonomy, 
when compared to local governments in larger or more heterogeneous countries.
17
  
This lack of local rights activity began to change in 2005, when the small southern 
city of Jinju declared itself a ‘human rights city’.18 Gwangju Metropolitan City, which is a 
higher-level local administrative entity governing Korea’s sixth largest city, followed suit in 
2007 with the enactment of a democracy, human rights, and peace development ordinance, 
and later with its own ‘human rights city’ declaration and its establishment of a Human 
                                                          
15
 Korean conservatives generally support movements to improve human rights in North Korea, however, while 
progressives have traditionally been reluctant to integrate human rights objectives into inter-Korean relations: 
Andrew Wolman, ‘South Korea’s Response to Human Rights Abuses in North Korea: An Analysis of Policy 
Options’ (2013) 110 AsiaPacific Issues 1. 
16
 Baik (n 10) 896. 
17
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districts (25 of which are in Seoul), 73 autonomous cities and 83 counties. 
18
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Rights Learning and Human Rights Cities: Achievements Report’ (March 2007) 3 
<www.pdhre.org/achievements-HR-cities-mar-07.pdf> accessed 6 January 2016. 
 
 
Rights Division (in 2010), a Citizens’ Commission on the Promotion of Human Rights 
(2012), and a Human Rights Ombudsman (2013).
19
 Gwangmyeong City, near Seoul, adopted 
a human rights ordinance in 2011 and set up a human rights council in 2012.
20
 Dong Gu 
(borough) of Ulsan Metropolitan City also passed a human rights promotion ordinance in 
2011, and established a human rights commission in 2012.
21
 While these early local 
initiatives reflected the influence of the global movement towards ‘human rights cities’, they 
were also inspired by local histories. In the case of Gwangju, human rights and 
democratisation was particularly important because Gwangju was the site of a brutal 
massacre of democratisation protestors in 1980.  Jinju city leaders were inspired by the 
Hyeongpyeong Movement, a movement for the abolition of status-based discrimination that 
started in Jinju in the 1920s, and Ulsan Dong Gu’s declaration emphasised workers’ rights 
because the locality has long been one of the centres of the Korean labour movement.
22
 In the 
few years following these early movers and the passage of the Seoul Human Rights 
Ordinance (discussed below), local human rights initiatives have become increasingly 
widespread: as of February 2015, 15 out of 17 first-level sub-national administrative 
divisions in Korea have passed human rights ordinances, as have 55 out of 227 second-level 
administrative divisions.
23
 In addition to Seoul, 19 sub-national jurisdictions in Korea have 
created sub-national human rights institutions (at the provincial, city and neighbourhood 
levels).
24
  
 
 
III. Legal Framework for the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson 
 
It was in this context of growing local governmental human rights activity that Park Won-
soon ran for the Seoul Mayor position in 2011. Park was at the time known as one of the 
country’s most prominent human rights lawyers. After attaining prominence as the defender 
of torture victim Kwon In Sook, Park co-founded and served as Secretary General of the 
Peoples’ Society of Participatory Democracy in 1994. In the following years, he helped 
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 Korea Human Rights Foundation (n 7) 219-20. 
20
 ibid 230. 
21
 ibid 228. 
22
 ibid 206. 
23
 Sung Soo Hong, ‘A Review of Human Rights Commissions in Local Authorities - A case of the Seoul Human 
Rights Commission’ (2015) 26 Chungnam L Rev 93, 96 (the two first-level divisions that lack human rights 
ordinances are Incheon and Jeju). 
24
 Korea Human Rights Foundation (n 7) 218-19 (this figure includes human rights centres, offices, 
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found the Korea Human Rights Foundation and later established the Beautiful Foundation, 
one of the country’s largest charities.25  It was not a complete surprise when Park proclaimed 
the Seoul Citizens’ Human Rights Declaration on 19 October 2011, as one of his highest 
profile campaign commitments.
26
 The Declaration consisted of ten articles which largely 
focused on traditional economic, social and cultural rights (articles 3 and 6 to 10), but also 
protected the right to participate in and access information about city government (article 1), 
right to free assembly (article 2), right to life (article 4), right to access the city (article 5) and 
contained a non-discrimination commitment (preamble).
27
 Within a week of his election in 
November 2011, Park adopted the Declaration as the framework for his human rights policy, 
along with a plan to establish a human rights ombudsperson institution in the city.
28
 
 During the following months, the legal framework for the Seoul Human Rights 
Ombudsperson Office, along with other core elements of Park’s human rights policy, was 
drafted and enacted on September 28 as the Seoul Human Rights Framework Ordinance.
29
 
According to the Framework Ordinance, the Mayor is authorised to appoint up to five human 
rights ombudspersons, who must have human rights expertise and either have work 
experience in government or academia, or be recommended for the position by a civil society 
human rights organisation.
30
 These ombudspersons are appointed to renewable two-year 
terms and are intended to act independently, with protection against dismissal.
31
 The 
ombudspersons are mandated to investigate any complaint alleging  ‘human rights 
infringement’ by the Seoul City government, an administrative agency under its jurisdiction, 
a borough where the infringement is related to affairs delegated by the City, or certain 
institutions and welfare facilities established by or subsidised by the City.
32
  
 In addition to authorising the establishment of the Seoul Human Rights 
Ombudsperson Office, the Framework Ordinance also established the Seoul Human Rights 
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 Lee Sun-young, ‘Park Won-soon: Frustrated Activist Jumps into Politics’ The Korea Herald (Seoul, 4 
October 2011) <www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20111004000869> accessed 6 January 2016. From 2005, 
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26
 Korea Human Rights Foundation (n 7) 224. 
27
 Seoul City Government, ‘서울시민권리선언' (Seoul Citizens’ Human Rights Declaration) 
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 Joseph Chu, ‘New Seoul City Mayor’s Actions to Prioritize Human Rights’ (South Korea Human Rights 
Monitor, 18 November 2011) <www.humanrightskorea.org/2011/weekly-news-brief-november-1418-2011/> 
accessed 6 January 2016. 
29
 Framework Ordinance on Human Rights (Enactment no 5367, 28 September 2012). 
30
 ibid art 18. 
31
 ibid art 19. 
32
 ibid art 20(1). 
 
 
Centre and Seoul Human Rights Committee.
33
 The Human Rights Centre engages in a wide 
range of human rights activities, including human rights research, education, developing 
programmes to improve human rights, and consulting on human rights infringements.
34
 It is 
also specifically mandated to assist the ombudspersons in their work.
35
 In part, this is done 
through the establishment of a human rights protection team, which is in charge of 
counseling petitioners and registering cases to be reported to the Ombudsperson Office.
36
 In 
addition, the ombudspersons are able to use the Centre as a type of secretariat, for tasks such 
as on-site investigations, inspection of documents, and collecting of information or 
materials.
37
 Unlike the Ombudsperson Office, however, the Human Rights Centre operates as 
an administrative division of Seoul City Government and is not designed to be functionally 
independent.
38
 
The Seoul Human Rights Committee is a 15-member independent advisory board, 
that is mandated to deliberate and provide advice on the establishment and implementation of 
the City’s human rights plan, laws and policies affecting human rights, the operation of the 
Human Rights Centre, and other matters brought to the Committee's attention by the Mayor, 
the Committee Chairperson, or the three committee members.
39
 Ombudspersons are 
permitted to attend Committee meetings and provide recommendations.
40
 While the 
Committee does not participate in the ombudspersons’ decision-making process, it has made 
efforts to secure the institutional independence of the Ombudspersons Office during its 
establishment and early years.
41
 The establishment of separate human rights ombudsperson 
and human rights committee bodies in the same jurisdiction is somewhat unusual; in most 
cases around the world, a single body will handle both policy review and complaint handling 
functions. In Seoul’s case the decision to create two separate bodies has been a subject of 
controversy, and the precise division of workload between them is still a matter of debate.
42
 
On the one hand, separating the ombudspersons from the policy monitoring and advisory 
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34
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37
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38
 Interview with Park Dongsuk, Director of Seoul City Human Rights Division (Seoul, Korea, 18 November 
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39
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40
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<www.whrcf.org/bbs/board.php?bo_table=announc_eng&wr_id=21&page=2> accessed 6 January 2016. 
42
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functions allows them to devote their time exclusively to community complaints while 
retaining the image of independence that comes with greater separation from the policy-
making process. On the other hand, the existence of two bodies creates greater complexity 
and the potential for jurisprudential conflicts or turf wars. 
The Seoul Human Rights Ombudspersons Office, Human Rights Committee and 
Human Rights Centre are all physically located in the same open-plan office on the second 
floor of City Hall, and to a large extent can be viewed as different core elements of a single 
coherent municipal human rights system. However, they are supplemented by other human 
rights institutions that focus either on a particular issue area or a particular borough of the 
City. At the Seoul City level, there is a Centre for the Human Rights for Persons with 
Disabilities and a Committee on the Human Rights of the Child and Youth.
43
 At the borough 
level, Seongbukgu, Dongjakgu and Seodaemungu have all passed human rights ordinances.
44
 
Seongbukgu’s human rights system is most advanced, and provides for the establishment of a 
human rights administrative office and an independent human rights committee.
45
  
 
 
IV. Establishment and Operation of the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson Office 
 
After a brief period of establishing the office, the Ombudspersons Office became operational 
in January 2013.
46
 While the Seoul Human Right Framework Ordinance authorises the 
appointment of up to five ombudspersons, so far only three have served at one time; currently 
the three ombudspersons are Lee Eun Sang, Jeon Sung Whi, and Yoo Jae Hyeong.
47
 While 
Ombudsperson Lee has an activist background, Ombudspersons Jeon and Yoo came to the 
job from national-level commissions, respectively the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights 
Commission (ACCRC) and the Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims of 
Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea.
48
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44
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48
 Email from Lee Eun Sang, Seoul City Human Rights Ombudsperson to author (18 January 2016). 
 
 
For such a young institution, the Ombudsperson Office has received a relatively 
significant number of complaints, perhaps illustrating that it is filling a need for local-level 
human rights complaint resolution. So far, from its establishment in January 2013 through 
January 2016, the Ombudsperson Office has received 726 complaints, of which it has 
investigated 326 cases and issued 38 recommendations.
49
 These cases covered a wide range 
of human rights violations, but workplace harassment (including sexual harassment), 
discrimination, right to privacy, and rights of the disabled have been particularly common 
subjects for complaints. All decisions have been taken on a consensus basis, although this has 
been done by custom rather than requirement, and the Ombudspersons Office has not yet 
established an official policy as to whether to decide based on majority vote or require 
unanimity in case of disagreement.
50
 While the Ombudspersons’ recommendations are non-
binding, as is the norm for ombudsperson institutions around the world, over 90 per cent of 
Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson recommendations have so far been followed by the 
City.
51
 
 One innovative programme that has been put into place to help integrate Seoul 
residents in the decision-making process is the so-called Citizens’ Human Rights Jury. Under 
this initiative, a group of 150 Seoul residents (above the age of 14) and 50 experts are 
impaneled, among whom eight residents and four experts can be chosen to form juries to rule 
on human rights petitions that are expected to have a particularly strong influence on 
society.
52
 Juries can be formed at the request of the Ombudspersons Office, Human Rights 
Committee or Mayor, but are only available with the petitioner’s permission.53 Verdicts are 
then approved by a favourable vote of two-thirds of the members, with the jury presided over 
by a non-voting expert appointed by the Ombudspersons.
54
 So far human rights juries have 
been established in three cases.
55
 The Ombudspersons can overrule a jury’s decision on any 
particular case, however (and in fact, this has already happened).
56
  
 In order to illustrate the work of the Ombudsperson Office, along with its potential 
challenges, three of the most significant cases to be decided so far will be examined in 
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greater depth. The first case involved a petition from Lee Chung Heon, in his role as 
president of the Chinese Residents’ Association of Seoul Korea.57 Lee alleged that the City of 
Seoul was engaged in discriminatory treatment of Hwagyo (Chinese nationals) who were 
residents of Seoul, because Korean nationals over the age of 65 could ride the Seoul public 
transit system for free and access various sites such as museums and royal tombs for free, 
while Hwagyo over the age of 65 with permanent residency in Korea were denied such 
benefits.
58
 According to Lee, this rule was unfair because Hwagyo residents paid full taxes 
and otherwise fulfilled the duties of citizens, with the exception of military service. The City 
defended its policy by claiming that they were already running the subway system at a 
significant deficit, and thus could not afford to change their policies. 
 On 28 June 2013, the Ombudsperson Office ruled in Lee’s favour. The decision stated 
that Hwagyo can be considered ‘Seoul citizens’ according to article 2 of the Framework 
Ordinance,
59
 emphasising that they share virtually equal local rights (with the exception of 
eligibility for a few local political offices) and local responsibilities with Korean nationals. 
The Ombudsperson Office then concluded that discrimination against permanent residents 
living in Seoul with regard to welfare benefits violated their human rights, as defined under 
article 2 of the National Human Rights Commission Act.
60
 This conclusion was supported by 
citing a decision of the Constitutional Court, a ruling of the NHRCK on equal rights, and the 
governments’ inclusion of migrant children in a welfare scheme under the Juvenile Welfare 
Support Act. Finally, the Ombudsperson Office compared Seoul’s policy unfavourably with 
practices in the United States and Europe, and admonished the City that continuing with such 
discrimination was inconsistent with its goal of becoming a ‘human rights city’. The 
Ombudsperson Office recommended a revision of various Seoul City policies toward foreign 
national permanent residents (including but not limited to Hwagyo), and specifically their 
inclusion in the senior citizen free-ride scheme for Seoul public transit. 
There was significant tension and political opposition regarding this recommendation 
from the public transit authorities, who reiterated their financial constraints.
61
 Eventually, 
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however, the policies on the Seoul bus and subway system towards permanent residents over 
the age of 65 were liberalised to allow for the withdrawal of one-time free-ride cards with a 
refundable deposit, and by June 2015, free travel was finally allowed on an entirely non-
discriminatory basis.
62
  
A second important migrant rights petition was received in 2014, this time from an 
unnamed petitioner on behalf of an unregistered migrant from Mongolia.
63
 The petition 
alleged that the fact that unregistered migrants were ineligible to participate in Seoul City’s 
provision of free childcare for children under the age of six constituted impermissible 
discrimination. The petitioner argued that the exclusion of unregistered children from free 
childcare was inconsistent with the Framework Ordinance, the UN Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, and a recommendation made by the NHRCK on the right to education of 
migrant children. 
The Ombudsperson Office referred this case to the Citizen Jury, which decided by an 
eight to four vote that the exclusion of unregistered children from social welfare service 
constituted a discriminatory policy prohibited by the Korean Constitution, the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, the National Human Rights Commission Act, the Infant Care Act, the 
Seoul Human Rights Ordinance and the Ordinance on the Protection and Promotion of 
Human Rights of the Child and Youth. The Citizen Jury stressed that the interests of the 
children should be taken into account first, and recommended that the City take all 
appropriate administrative measures to guarantee necessary protection and ensure that a 
system is in place to make childcare subsidies and other benefits available to undocumented 
children. The Seoul Government’s initial reaction has been to state that it would consider the 
Ombudsperson Office’s recommendation.64 Specifically, it agreed to launch a study into the 
number of unregistered immigrants’ children currently residing in Seoul, before addressing 
issues of budgeting and other matters required to bring about a policy change.
65
 
A third case that attracted considerable public attention involved a petition alleging 
that the president of the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra (Park Hyun-jung) had engaged in 
sexually and physically abusive behavior toward several of her employees since assuming 
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office in February 2013.
66
 The petition was delivered to the Ombudsperson Office two days 
after 17 orchestra employees sent a letter detailing the abuse to the media, with the 
allegations publicly refuted by Park.  Unlike the cases previously discussed, this case was not 
involved with the question of whether a law or policy was appropriate, but rather whether an 
individual in fact engaged in sexual harassment and workplace bullying, and if so whether 
these specific actions could be considered infringements on personal rights. 
After completing a fact-finding investigation, the Ombudsperson Office found that 
sexually humiliating expressions had been used by Park to both male and female employees, 
and that employees had been subject to insults and extreme expressions that in fact constitute 
workplace bullying and contravene the personal rights protections in article 10 of the Korean 
Constitution. The Ombudsperson Office also found that during the course of the investigation, 
the victims had been forced to work in the same space as the person who inflicted harm on 
them, which caused them further damage. The Ombudsperson Office therefore recommended 
to the Mayor that Park be subject to disciplinary measures and receive human rights 
education, and that the Orchestra should implement measures to prevent workplace bullying. 
Furthermore, it recommended that paid holidays and psychotherapy be provided to the 
victims, and that Seoul-affiliated organisations (like the Orchestra) should follow the Seoul 
City Guidelines on the Prevention of Recurrence of Sexual Harassment and Verbal Abuse. 
In the immediate aftermath of the ombudsperson recommendation, Park offered her 
resignation, which was accepted.
67
 This was not the end of the story, however. A police 
investigation soon cleared Park of the charges against her and, following a police raid on the 
orchestra’s office and network administrator, 10 of the 17 original petitioners were booked on 
charges of false accusation.
68
 Eventually the wife of the orchestra’s conductor was also 
indicted on charges of defaming Park, and the orchestra’s conductor stepped down amid 
accusations of embezzlement.
69
 Beyond the ongoing drama and still-disputed facts, this case 
brings up interesting questions regarding the power of Seoul’s Ombudsperson Office and its 
place within the spectrum of justice institutions. At the end of the day, the ombudsperson’s 
investigatory conclusions were ignored and in fact directly contradicted by the parallel work 
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of police investigators who possessed greater authority and resources, and whose work could 
lead to the formal filing of criminal charges. In this case, the ombudsperson investigation 
could be seen as a waste of civic resources at best, and at worst as a way for the orchestra 
employees to gain credibility for their defamation of Park by choosing a forum that was 
perhaps more inclined to believe their claims of harassment while less able (compared to 
police investigators) to thoroughly examine counter-claims. 
 
 
V. Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson Office and the Broader Human Rights 
Regime 
 
This section will address in some more detail the question of how the Seoul Human Rights 
Ombudsperson Office fits into the broader international human rights regime. It will 
contextualise these questions with reference to the existing body of research into the 
relationship of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) and sub-national human rights 
institutions with other human rights actors and norms. 
 
 
A. Local and Global Factors in the Establishment of the Seoul Human Rights 
Ombudsperson 
 
As a starting point, it is important to examine the role of other human rights actors in the 
establishment of the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson. To what extent was its creation a 
result of influences from existing forces or a reaction to local concerns? At the national level, 
there is a considerable body of research into the establishment of NHRIs, including 
ombudsperson institutions.
70
 Some of this research highlights the importance of the United 
Nations and other major international actors such as the Council of Europe and the 
Commonwealth in the proliferation of NHRIs during the 1990s and 2000s.
71
 Pegram also 
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notes the importance of contagion from regional peers,
72
 while other commentators have 
highlighted the importance of regional and global NHRI networks in encouraging the 
establishment of new bodies.
73
 In a few instances, NHRIs have been imposed by coercive 
external agencies, generally in the context of a peace agreement ending civil war or 
communal tensions.
74
 Reif claims that the forces responsible for human rights 
ombudspersons’ proliferation include ‘democratization, public institution building, 
comparative law influences, limited state resources, international and regional movements to 
establish national human rights institutions, [and the adoption of treaties] that rely on NHRIs, 
for domestic implementation of international human rights obligations’.75 
While there has been less research into the factors accounting for the emergence of 
sub-national human rights ombudspersons, there are a few patterns that stand out. For 
example, it seems common for sub-national ombudspersons to be established in polities 
where there is also a human rights ombudsperson at the national level, examples being Spain, 
Mexico, Argentina and Russia.
76
 In some of these cases, the establishment of sub-national 
human rights ombudspersons (or commissions) was either encouraged or otherwise supported 
by the national institution.
77
 There has also been some research into the proliferation of 
‘human rights cities’, some of which have also established human rights ombudspersons. 
According to Oomen and Baumgärtel, the establishment of human rights cities was 
sometimes a civil society-driven initiative, but more frequently occurred at the initiative of 
local authorities who wanted to increase engagement with the human rights framework.
78
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Some of the external factors that have been instrumental in the establishment of other 
NHRIs and sub-national human rights ombudspersons have clearly not played an important 
role in the establishment of the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson. International 
organisations such as the UN have so far been relatively silent regarding the promotion of 
local human rights ombudsperson institutions, in Korea or elsewhere,
79
 as have regional 
organisations, at least outside of their own member states.
80
 Trans-governmental networks of 
municipal human rights ombudspersons are weak and largely unable to influence the 
development of new institutions.
81
 The Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson was not imposed 
by outside forces pursuant to any peace accords. It is also difficult to credit a contagion effect 
from regional peers because the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson is the first of its type in 
Korea, and indeed appears to be one of the first of its type anywhere in East Asia (with the 
exception of a few municipal human rights ombudspersons in mid-sized Japanese cities).
82
  
This is not to say that international actors were entirely irrelevant to the establishment 
of the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson. Norms of local human rights institutionalisation 
that had developed mainly in Europe (especially those associated with the Right to the City, 
made popular by Henri Lefebvre and David Harvey) clearly had made their way to the 
Korean peninsula by 2011, most notably at the 2011 World Human Rights Cities Forum in 
Gwangju. This major conference, which is now repeated annually in Gwangju, hosted 
delegates from many cities around the world with experience in human rights implementation, 
and concluded by urging the development of local human rights institutions.
83
 As a 
                                                          
79
 There have been a few exceptional statements from UN sources that have mentioned local mechanisms, 
generally as supplements to national human rights institutions. See eg United Nations General Assembly, 
‘Resolution 67/163, The Role of the Ombudsman, Mediator, and other National Human Rights Institutions in 
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights’ (UN Doc A/RES/67/163, 2013) 
<www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/67/163> accessed 10 March 2017 (encouraging 
member states to ‘consider the creation or the strengthening of independent and autonomous ombudsman, 
mediator and other national human rights institutions at the national and, where applicable, the local level’). 
80
 The Council of Europe has been active in promoting local human rights ombudsmen within its borders: 
Council of Europe Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, ‘On the Role of Local and Regional Mediators/ 
Ombudsmen in Defending Citizen’s Rights’ (Recommendation 61, 17 June 1999) < 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?p=&id=848103&direct=true> accessed 10 March 2017. 
81
 Andrew Wolman, ‘Sub-National Human Rights Institutions and Transgovernmental Networks’ (2015) 33 
Nordic J of Human Rights 110, 127-28. 
82
 Reif, The Ombudsman, Good Governance, and the International Human Rights System (n 5) 31. While the 
Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson may not be a product of regional contagion, there is some evidence that it 
has produced a contagion effect, as other sub-national governments in Korea such as Gwangju and Gangwon-do 
have established human rights ombudsperson institutions in following years: Seoul Metropolitan Government 
Human Rights Division (n 7) 9. In some of these cases, the political dynamic has also mirrored that of Seoul, 
namely a progressive local leader (like Ahn Hee-jung in Chungcheongnamdo) with a background as a human 
rights activist has established institutions upon winning political office, in the background of continued 
conservative leadership at the national level. 
832011 World Human Rights Cities Forum, ‘Gwangju Declaration on Human Rights City’ (16-17 May 2011) 
<www.uclg-
 
 
prominent human rights lawyer, Park Won-soon would have been exposed to these 
international developments; reportedly he modeled his Seoul Citizens’ Human Rights 
Declaration in part on documents drafted in other ‘human rights cities’ around the world 
including Montreal, Barcelona, and Eugene, Oregon.
84
 
Within this context of awareness of the importance of the international trends in local 
rights implementation in Korean human rights circles by 2011 to 2012, two other local 
factors also appear of critical importance for the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson’s 
establishment: first, the importance of human rights (and their institutionalisation) to Park 
Won-soon and others on the Korean political left, and second, the complex contribution of 
the NHRCK to the Ombudsperson Office’s founding. 
In discussions with a current ombudsperson and the head of the Seoul Human Rights 
Division, both stressed the overwhelming importance of Mayor Park Won-soon’s vision in 
the establishment of Seoul’s human rights institutions. 85  Clearly, the creation of the 
Ombudsperson Office was a direct reflection of his longstanding embrace of the human 
rights movement (and association with it). While Park’s importance to the Office’s founding 
is unquestionable, it is important to emphasise that his proposals were consistent with a long-
standing idea in Korean left-wing politics that civil society human rights activists should be 
integrated into government as the best way to ensure progressive governance.
86
 The apex of 
this trend occurred during the progressive Roh Moo Hyun administration, when, according to 
one study, 158 government positions were filled by current or former members of People’s 
Society for Participatory Democracy (a human rights and social justice organisation of which 
Park was one time the Secretary-General).
87
 In a sense, the establishment of a human rights 
ombudsperson office is a continuation of this strategy of making a place for human rights in 
governance institutions, and the development of a local human rights system was always 
likely to follow the election of Park to the mayoralty.
88
 Moreover, Park’s successful 
utilisation of human rights institutionalisation as a major campaign plank demonstrates that 
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human rights concepts already had a certain saliency among Seoul residents due to their long 
association with heroes of the political left such as Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun.  
Secondly, the NHRCK was a more complex factor in the background of the Seoul 
Human Rights Ombudsperson’s founding. In early 2008, the NHRCK started a campaign to 
encourage Korean municipalities to enact local human rights ordinances, and organised 
meetings for that purpose in Gwangju.
89
 This campaign culminated in the issuance of a 
recommendation in April 2012 on the establishment of human rights cities, along with a 
model local human rights ordinance.
90
 In 2010, however, there were significant changes at 
the NHRCK, when conservative president Lee Myung Bak appointed a new chairperson, 
Hyun Byung-chul, who had no human rights experience and was widely perceived to be a 
weak human rights supporter.
91
 At this point, the NHRCK gradually stopped being trusted by 
many progressives and human rights advocates.
92
 This weakness, in turn, became a 
justification for why it might be necessary to have other governmental institutions that could 
promote and protect human rights while staying out of the control of the now-conservative 
national leaders. In short, because the NHRCK could no longer be trusted as a strong 
independent voice for human rights, progressive local leaders were incentivised to create 
their own institutions.
93
 Ombudsperson Lee more diplomatically stated that the NHRCK’s 
inability to quickly respond to all the petitions that it received opened space for the Seoul 
Human Rights Ombudsperson to more promptly respond to inquiries regarding Seoul City 
government.
94
 
 
B. Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson and Relationships with Existing Human Rights 
Institutions 
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When the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson commenced its operations in 2013, it did not 
occupy a human rights vacuum; on the contrary, as discussed earlier Korea was already well-
integrated into the international human rights regime at the time, and a variety of 
governmental and non-governmental actors in Seoul were and are engaged in promoting and 
protecting human rights. The question thus arises: how does the Seoul Human Rights 
Ombudsperson interact with these other institutions? In other contexts, sub-national human 
rights ombudsperson institutions around the world have developed a range of different 
relationships. Some collaborate with their country’s national human rights ombudsperson 
institution, as is the case for example in Argentina, where there are formal collaboration 
agreements between the national human rights ombudsman and all provincial and municipal 
human rights ombudsmen in the country.
95
 Some have networked with their peers in other 
localities, whether on a formal or informal basis.
96
 A few ombudsperson institutions have 
participated in UN or regional human rights mechanisms, for example through contributing 
to periodic reports to UN treaty bodies, acting as Preventive Mechanisms under the Optional 
Protocol for the Convention against Torture or meeting with UN Special Rapporteurs.
97
  
In the case of the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson, there appears to be relatively 
little contact between local human rights institutions and actors at the national, regional, or 
global level. There have been no meetings or cooperation between the Seoul Human Rights 
Ombudsperson and the national government.
98
 There has been no formal coordination 
between the NHRCK and the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson Office, although there are 
informal contacts when needed, for example to discuss cases that are pending in both 
institutions, and NHRCK decisions have been cited on occasion.
99
 Nor are there formal 
meetings with the national-level ACCRC, although informal contacts exist, as one of the 
current ombudspersons worked for the ACCRC.
100
 Similarly, the Seoul Human Rights 
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Ombudsperson has not had any interactions with international institutions, with the minor 
exception of contributions to a UN Human Rights Council questionnaire response regarding 
Seoul human rights initiatives.
101
 Given the fact that the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson 
Office was established at the initiative of Mayor Park Won-soon and without the active 
support of the national government or international figures, this lack of formal cooperation is 
perhaps unsurprising. Whether or not this low level of institutional integration is a significant 
problem is of course a more difficult question. In general, however, there are good reasons to 
favour stronger relationships between sub-national human rights institutions and their 
national or international counterparts. Sub-national human rights institutions can provide 
valuable information and perspectives on local human rights issues to national or 
international monitoring bodies, while at the same time benefitting from the exposure to new 
norms and human rights expertise developed at the national or international levels.
102
 Sub-
national human rights institutions can also benefit politically from support by more powerful 
national bodies to ensure that their recommendations are carried out without undue delay; the 
ombudsperson’s recommendation in the Hwagyo case, for example, might have been carried 
out more promptly if the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson Office had been more 
successful in enlisting political backing from potential national-level allies. 
 While the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson Office has had few interactions with 
national or international human rights actors, it has made a concerted effort to interact with 
local citizens and civil society groups. The Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson has held 
twice a year meetings with civil society representatives and operates a hotline for feedback 
from the community.
103
 It also accepts complaints from civil society organisations (as well as 
individuals), and has had several important cases submitted by associations, including the 
Hwagyo case discussed above. On at least one occasion, the Ombudsperson Office has also 
consulted with a representative of a civil society organisation (Amnesty International Korea) 
for advice in deciding a case.
104
 In addition to this openness to dialogue with civil society 
organisations, Seoul human rights institutions have made a number of efforts at involving 
individual private citizens in its work. For example, the Seoul Human Rights Ombudspersons 
Office sometimes holds briefings for civil society representatives to attend when they are 
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releasing a particularly noteworthy recommendation.
105
 Perhaps the Citizens’ Human Rights 
Jury program described above represents the most concerted effort to solicit the input of 
private citizens.  
The Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson Office (along with its sister institutions) has 
also been proactive in interacting with other peer sub-national human rights institutions in 
Korea. For example, in March 2015, the Seoul Human Rights Committee and the 
Chungcheongnamdo (province) Human Rights Promotion Committee signed a formal 
cooperation agreement, and the Seoul Human Rights Division has also recently hosted a 
workshop targeted at 17 different local human rights offices to discuss best practices and 
ongoing initiatives.
106
 Separately, the Seoul Human Rights Ombudspersons have also met 
with their peers in cities such as Gwangju and Suwon on a mostly informal basis, and have 
been involved in trying to set up an official network of Korean human rights 
ombudspersons.
107
 Given Seoul’s position as the largest (by far) municipality in Korea, it is 
not particularly surprising that it is playing a leadership role with regards to other Korean 
local areas’ development of human rights institutions.  
 
C. Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson and Types of Human Rights Norms Used 
 
Finally, it is worth examining the types of norms used. There is already a small body of 
research examining the types of human rights norms that are used by sub-national human 
rights institutions.
108
 Fundamentally, one can point to three types of normative sources. First, 
some sub-national human rights institutions are explicitly mandated to implement one or 
more forms of international human rights norms. In a few notable cases, this has even led to 
municipalities embracing a wider range of human rights treaties than are accepted at the 
national level by their home country.
109
 Second, some sub-national human rights institutions 
are mandated to implement human rights norms contained elsewhere in the national-level 
laws or jurisprudence of the country where the sub-national institution is located. Third, local 
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normative sources can be developed by, for example, the passage of a human rights charter. 
This may allow for the development of new human rights norms or divergent interpretations 
of existing norms that reflect local values and interests.  
In the case of the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson, the ombudspersons are 
mandated by the Framework Ordinance to investigate petitions of human rights 
infringements, with the term ‘human rights’ defined as ‘any of human dignity, self-worth, 
liberty and rights, which are prescribed by the Constitution and statutes, or acknowledged by 
international human rights treaties signed or ratified by the Republic of Korea and by 
customary international laws’.110 In practice, the ombudspersons have clearly made a point of 
employing a wide variety of norms. National-level norms have been most commonly cited. 
Out of 21 published decisions from the period of December 2012 to March 2015, 17 
decisions cite national statutes, including on several occasions the National Human Rights 
Commission Act, the Act on the Prohibition of Discrimination of Disabled Persons, and the 
Framework Act on Women’s Development. 111  In addition, 18 decisions cite the Korean 
Constitution, most commonly article 10, which protects the right to dignity and the pursuit of 
happiness.
112
  
Interestingly, however, the ombudspersons have also proved very willing to refer to 
international treaty norms, and even to take into account findings from other countries’ laws 
and jurisprudence. For example, the Ombudsperson Office has cited UN human rights 
treaties in eight out of 21 published cases.
113
 In several other cases, a broad range of 
international norms have been cited from outside the UN treaty system. For example in a 16 
October 2014 decision, the Ombudsperson Office cited an International Labour Organisation 
Resolution, a UN Declaration, and a case from the US Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission.
114
 The following month, the Ombudsperson Office cited the European 
Framework Agreement on Harassment and Violence at Work as well as relevant laws in 
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Sweden, France and Japan.
115
 Three decisions have cited the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. Oftentimes, these international norms are cited in conjunction with relevant local or 
national norms, as was the case in the Childcare Support for Unregistered Migrants case 
reviewed above. 
Meanwhile, relatively few human rights norms from local (Seoul) sources have been 
used to determine the scope of rights protection, the notable exceptions being the Seoul 
Metropolitan Government Guidelines for the Prevention of Sexual Harassment, which was 
cited as a source in four of the 21 published cases,
116
 and the Seoul Ordinance on the 
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights of the Child and Youth, which was cited on three 
occasions.
117
 In fact, there have been efforts by Mayor Park and the Seoul Human Rights 
Centre to draft a distinctive human rights charter for Seoul, but these efforts have so far been 
unsuccessful. Consistent with the human rights plan laid out in Park’s campaign declaration, 
in 2014 the Human Rights Centre selected a committee of 150 ordinary citizens and 30 
human rights experts to draft a charter that could be adopted by Seoul City.
118
 The end result 
was a draft document called the Seoul Citizens’ Human Rights Charter, which consisted of 
50 articles protecting a wide range of rights, including several economic, social, and cultural 
rights as well as rights regarding political participation and transparency. While the document 
in many ways reflects classic human rights norms, it also includes several clauses which are 
peculiarly suited to the urban context,
119
 and some that seem particularly consistent with 
Korean concerns, one example being the article 12 right to be protected from disasters and 
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accidents, which reflects Korea’s widespread revulsion at lax enforcement of safety standards 
in the wake of the April 2014 Sewol ferry disaster.
120
  
When Mayor Park attempted to adopt the Seoul Citizens’ Human Rights Charter, 
however, these various clauses were all overshadowed by a controversy centred on the fact 
that the anti-discrimination clause (article 4) protected sexual minorities (among many other 
groups), and the right to be protected from social violence (article 15) also specifically noted 
sexual minorities as an at-risk group.
121
 Conservative elements (particularly associated with 
certain Christian groups) fiercely protested the inclusion of these clauses, while criticising 
Park for going beyond the appropriate role of a local official in order to gain publicity for a 
potential presidential run.
122
 In the end Park decided not to adopt the Charter because of the 
lack of a social consensus on the issue.
123
 This decision was in turn harshly criticised by 
progressive activists who felt that Park had not stood up firmly for their rights.
124
 According 
to both Mayor Park and the head of the Seoul Human Rights Centre, the passage of the 
Charter will be at some point revisited, and it remains an important policy goal for the 
administration.
125
  
Finally it should be noted that there have been other interesting attempts to develop 
new human rights norms at the borough level in Seoul. Seongbuk-Gu, for example, has 
promulgated a Human Rights Charter, despite the objections of anti-LGBT rights 
protesters.
126
 In addition to those clauses commonly seen in human rights documents, the 
Seongbuk-Gu Charter also provides specific protection for senior citizens, marriage migrants, 
sexual minorities, the homeless, persons with infectious diseases, refugees, and North Korean 
refugees.
127
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VI. Conclusion 
 
In this case study, I have examined the operations of the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson 
Office, one of the first examples of a local human rights ombudsperson institution to be 
established in East Asia. In particular, I have explored the connections between the Seoul 
Human Rights Ombudsperson and other governmental and civil society actors, both inside 
and outside of Korea. In short, my findings show that the establishment of the Seoul Human 
Rights Ombudsperson was largely the result of local political initiatives grounded in a 
national political landscape where human rights discourse has taken on a particularly strong 
relevance. The Ombudsperson Office has accordingly developed fairly independently, with 
few institutional links to the outside world, although it borrows liberally from human rights 
norms developed at the national and international levels. 
What can we learn from this case study about local human rights implementation in 
Asia? Firstly, it is clear that given the existence of human rights-friendly leadership, there is 
room for local human rights mechanisms to make a real difference in peoples’ lives, and 
especially to encourage political actors to take into account the voices of the powerless, such 
as non-citizens in the discriminatory treatment of Hwagyo and the unregistered migrant 
childcare cases. These local mechanisms are not necessarily imposed from above or 
developed according to international standards. Rather, the Seoul Human Rights 
Ombudsperson shows how a local politician can develop a local human rights system as a 
result of personal conviction and constituent expectations without significant support from 
other actors, and in fact can position the office as a response to a perceived weakness in 
national-level human rights policies. This dynamic is resonant of certain local initiatives in 
the West, for example the decision by the San Francisco Human Rights Commission to 
(successfully) promote municipal adherence to the Convention on the Elimination of all 
forms of Discrimination Against Women, even though the treaty has not been ratified by the 
US. Local commissions can thus usher in stronger human rights policies in localities that are 
more progressive than the rest of the country in which they are located.
128
 
However, this case study also shows that more work needs to be done to integrate 
such institutions into a coherent human rights regime. Where there are multiple bodies 
capable of investigating the same complaint, there should be coordination to ensure that 
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forum shopping opportunities are kept to a minimum, and that a consistent human rights 
jurisprudence can develop among the different concerned entities. While the risk of parallel 
investigations was perhaps made most clear in the aftermath of the Seoul Philharmonic 
Orchestra harassment case, the lack of formal guidelines regulating jurisdictional overlap 
with the NHRCK and ACCRC may in the long run create greater risks of duplicative 
investigations or forum shopping. 
Finally, this case study demonstrates that opportunities exist for local human rights 
institutions to work towards the implementation and jurisprudential development of both 
local norms and international norms such as UN treaties and declarations. This normative 
mix may provide a good opportunity for local human rights institutions to engage in the 
localisation of human rights norms, meaning, according to one definition, ‘the active 
construction [of new norms] through discourse, framing, grafting, and cultural selection of 
foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the former developing significant congruence 
with local beliefs and practices.’129 This process can facilitate the integration of local voices 
into the norm-development process and can perhaps produce new norms in areas such as the 
rights of the elderly that are particularly resonant in East Asian traditions but have been 
neglected at the global level.
130
 Critics might argue that this could lead to a certain degree of 
fragmentation of international human rights law, but this is not necessarily a bad thing; 
proponents of localisation accept that a degree of pluralism is both inevitable and welcome in 
today’s world.131  
Despite the potential benefits of greater local attention to the evolution of human 
rights norms, it is equally clear from the failed attempt to promulgate a Seoul Citizens’ 
Human Rights Charter that the process of implementing international norms or developing 
new norms at the local level can be fraught with political risks and the potential for conflict, 
just as it often is at the national or international levels. Smaller polities do not necessarily 
provide for a homogeneity of opinions. As local human rights mechanisms mature in Seoul 
and elsewhere, further research will be necessary to examine the substantive effects of 
moving the contested process of rights development to the realm of municipal institutions.   
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